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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT DALE STRALEY,
PETITIONER,

CASENO.990704-CA
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

v.
HANKGALETKA,
RESPONDENT.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION
Straley requested extraordinary relief to challenge two prison disciplinary hearings
(R. 96). He claimed that the prison failed to provide him necessary due process
protections. The first hearing stemmed from Straley's refusal to provide a urine sample.
For this violation of prison rules, the prison imposed 30 days of punitive isolation (id.).
The second hearing arose from Straley's involvement in a fight with another inmate (id.).
The sanction for this offense was 15 days in punitive isolation (R. 97). * The trial court
granted respondent's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction because the Utah Supreme Court transferred this
case pursuant to its pour-over authority. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996).
APPELLATE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does punitive isolation for 45 days constitute an "atypical and significant hardship
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" and, therefore, mandate the due

1

It appears that eight of the total 45 days ran concurrently (R. 95-96).
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process protections established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) See Sandin
v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)? This Court reviews the dismissal on a correctionof-error basis, giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Harmon City,
Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995).
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
All relevant provisions are discussed in the text of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Straley was involved in a fight with another inmate on May 23, 1998 (R. 95). As a
result of this behavior, the prison charged him with a violation of disciplinary rules and
held a hearing to determine culpability and the appropriate sanction. The hearing officer
concluded that Straley had been involved in the fight and imposed thirty (30) days of
punitive isolation (id). At approximately the same time, correctional officers ordered
Straley to submit to a urine test and provide a urine sample (id.). Straley refused and was
consequently charged with a disciplinary infraction for refusing to submit to a urine test
(id.). The hearing officer found that Straley had committed the infraction and imposed
fifteen (15) days of isolation (R. 96). Straley appealed both hearings through the prison's
internal administrative process, which upheld the decisions (id.).
Straley subsequently filed this petition for extraordinary relief, claiming that the
hearings violated due process. He included in his petition allegations that the prison
failed to provide him 24-hour notice of the hearing, used a computerized signature on the
charging document and the decision, relied on "falsified" information, lacked
impartiality, and failed to use a disciplinary committee for the hearing. However, he did
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not claim that his isolation was materially different from the conditions imposed on
inmates in purely discretionary segregation, such as administrative segregation or
protective custody.
After respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief,
attaching various documents from the prison regarding the reasons for the discipline and
the procedures used, the trial court granted the dismissal motion and denied extraordinary
relief.2 The trial court based its decision on Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995),
an opinion from the United States Supreme Court that narrowed greatly an inmate's
ability to argue that prison disciplinaries require procedural due process protection.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under current federal supreme court precedent, inmates are entitled to due process
before the imposition of discipline only when the sanction constitutes a "dramatic
departure" from his sentence or an "atypical and significant hardship." Straley's 45 day
term of punitive isolation, on the other hand, was well within the reasonably expected
contours of a fifteen year indeterminate term. Consequently, even if the prison failed to
provide minimal due process protections, that failure does not create a constitutional
violation.

2

Although respondent attached various documents to its dismissal motion,
potentially transforming it into a summary judgment proceeding, the trial court does not
appear to have based its decision on any of those facts. Instead, it made a pure legal
conclusion grounded on the allegations of the petition (R. 139).
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ARGUMENT
THE DISCIPLINE IMPOSED ON STRALEY FALLS WITHIN THE
EXPECTED PERIMETERS OF HIS ONE-TO-FIFTEEN YEAR
SENTENCES; THEREFORE, HE IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENTITLED TO THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS SET FORTH
IN WOLFF v. MCDONNELL.
Straley claims that the prison failed to provide him the due process protections
required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (R. 7, 8). Decided in 1974, Wolff
held that the Nebraska prison rules on disciplinary proceedings gave inmates a protected
liberty interest that could be abridged only via due process. The essential elements of due
process as then identified in fTo/^consisted of 24-hour notice, an opportunity to defend,
and a written decision setting forth the rationale. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-68. Wolff and its
progeny looked to the language of a state statute, rule, or policy to decide if the language
was mandatory. If so, the mandatory language created a liberty interest that was then
given due process protection. In other words, failure to comply with prison regulations
could result in a constitutional violation.
In 1995, however, the high court substantially limited Wolff to disciplinary
proceedings or other events that result in sanctions that constitute "atypical and
significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). With Sandin, the court departed from an
analysis based on the language of a rule or policy to an analysis based on the nature of the
sanction imposed in the context of "the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. If the
amount of discipline imposed is within the "expected perimeters of the sentence" the
inmate is not entitled to procedural due process, even those set forth in Wolff. The Sandin
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court discussed the evolution of prison due process cases and explained its reasons for
abandoning then current law.
[W]e believe that the search for a negative implication from
mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from
the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.... States may under certain
circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by
the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally
limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding
the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force
nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted).
The Sandin court identified only two in which state action exceeded the sentence
in such an "unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause by
its own force." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990) give rise to due process protection of their own force. Vitek concerned the
involuntary transfer of a mentally ill inmate to a mental hospital; Harper involved the
involuntary administration of psychiatric drugs on prison inmates. Both mandated due
process because of the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled mentally ill. The label
was "qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person
convicted of a crime." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478 n.4.
In contrast to those two circumstances are those incidents of prison life already
determined to be undeserving of procedural due process protection. These include a
transfer to an out-of-state prison, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983), visitation
privileges, Kentucky Dep V of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989), and non-
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punitive transfer to a maximum security unit, Meachum v. Fano, All U.S. 215, 227
(1976). Sandin added another event that is not entitled to due process protection, i.e.,
punitive isolation of up to 30 days. "[T]hough concededly punitive, [Connor's isolation]
does not present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of Connor's
indeterminate sentence." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
In applying Sandin courts have not bound themselves to the 30-day period
mentioned in that case, but have concluded that terms of isolation far beyond that period
of time also do not create a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197
F.3d 578, 589 (2nd Cir. 1999) (101 days); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir.
1997) (six months of segregation not atypical even though it occurred in "especially
disgusting conditions"); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998) (two and onehalf years in non-punitive isolation); Mackay v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997)
(eight months); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (71 days).
One case in which a court intimated that it might find an atypical and significant
hardship shows the contrast with the relatively innocuous circumstances of Straley's case.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Perkins v. Kansas Dep V of Corrections, 165 F.3d
803, 809 (10th Cir. 1999) reversed the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint from an inmate
who claimed that his conditions of confinement were unusually burdensome. When he
filed his complaint, Perkins had been restricted to isolation for more than a year,
prohibited from leaving his cell for more than a half-hour a day, and required to wear a
face mask whenever he left. Perkins, who was HIV-positive, claimed that the restrictions
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seriously interfered with his health.3 Given those allegations, said the court, it could not
conclude that the complaint was obviously without merit. Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806.
Straley, on the other hand, does not make any similar allegations. In fact, he
makes no allegations regarding the actual circumstances of his isolation (R. 7-13). He
certainly fails to explain how the conditions imposed upon him were "materially different
from those conditions imposed on inmates in . . . administrative segregation or protective
custody" or that they created a "major disruption" in his environment. Resnick v. Hayes,
200 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 2000).4 His complaints do not compare with even the bare
allegations of Perkins' complaint. Rather, they are more comparable to those cases, like
Sandin, Sealey, Beverati, Jones, Mackey, and Thomas, that found no atypical hardship by
the mere occurrence of isolation. Straley's grievances are even less similar to Vitek or
Harper, which involved the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled mentally ill.

3

The appellate court's reversal also must be viewed in the procedural context of
that case. The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is appropriate only "where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot
prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to
amend." Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. Essentially, the court concluded that the trial court
had been too hasty in its dismissal. Contrary to Perkins, the complaints in Sealey,
Beverati, Jones, Mackay, Thomas, and Sandin were dismissed only at the summary
judgment or trial stage.
4

Straley's failure to make these allegations in his complaint or in his response to the
motion to dismiss left the trial court with no choice but to assume that his isolation was
"within the range of confinement to be expected by prison inmates." Sandin, 515 U.S. at
486-87. Consequently, he failed to establish a cognizable claim for relief under rule
12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Resnick, 200 F.3d at 646 (affirming dismissal
under federal rule).
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What Straley argues is that the mere occurrence of discipline mandated due
process. Vvz-Sandin, this claim would have sufficed. After Sandin, however, it does not.
As the Sixth Circuit held in Resnick, an inmate must allege a material difference in his
conditions when compared to typical imprisonment. Otherwise, he has not even set forth
a claim. "Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls
within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." Sandin, 515
U.S. at 485. When Straley entered the prison to serve his concurrent one-to-fifteen year
terms, he may not have surrendered all of his constitutional rights at the prison gate, but
he surely did not keep the one that entitles him to social hour with other inmates. His
period of isolation was not so unduly burdensome or unusual that it presented a "dramatic
departure" from his sentence. Consequently, the due process clause is not implicated by
the prison's imposition of that sanction.5
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order denying relief and dismissing the petition should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED T H I S ^ 7

May 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
7AMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General

5

Straley does not argue that Utah's due process clause mandates a result different
from that reached in Sandin.
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ADDENDUM B

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT DALE STRALEY,
Plaintiff,

DECISION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.

Case No: 980912168

HANK GALETKA,
Defendant

Judge: THORNE, WILLIAM A
Date: 7/21/99

Clerk: lawclerk
The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. The Petitioner's
Motion for a Hearing on the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and
Discovery request are denied. The Petitioner is seeking relief
from two prison disciplinary actions, one in which he was sentenced
to thirty days in punitive isolation and the other, fifteen days in
punitive isolation. Petitioner claims that his due process rights
were violated. A prisoner's due process protections attach only
where the prison disciplinary action results in the deprivation of
a prisoner's protected liberty interest. Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453
(1985) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). The
Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner held that 3 0 days puntive
isolation imposed in a prison disciplinary action "did not present
the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State
might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 486 (1995). Petitioner Straley's is n^%ZJSM£9Xded due
result in the deprivation of a protected 1 i^yty<^fer>t§:r££b\
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